Hu Xiong, Yanan Chen, Zhong Chen, and Fagen Li
Password-based, three-party key exchange, authentication, provable security
Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols allow two users (clients) to establish a session key with the help of an authenticated server over an insecure channel. Owning to the significance in building a secure communication channel, a number of approaches have been suggested over the years. However, the lack of formal security proof is a major issue in the related literature. In this paper, we propose a simple 3PAKE protocol based upon elliptic curve cryptography along with formal security proof under the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. Experimental results by using the automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool also show that the proposed protocol is secure against various malicious attacks. Compared with previous work, the proposed protocol has lower computation costs and lighter communication loads.
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